This content was first published on IGR – Italian Gemological Review no. 22 in 2026. The information provided here is therefore current as of the original publication date.
By the end of 2024, the Kimberley Process was supposed to conclude a cycle of reforms and restore its international credibility. The opposite happened. The Dubai Plenary (17–21 November) formalised a structural crisis marked by the absence of leadership, decision-making paralysis, and a weak political mandate hollowed out by shifting geopolitical balances. The war in Ukraine is not an external shock to the KP; it is the factor that has definitively exposed its limitations.
The extraordinary extension of the United Arab Emirates’ chairmanship throughout 2025, due to the lack of countries willing to take over, had already made the deadlock evident. The third consecutive failure to reform the definition of “conflict diamonds” — frozen since 2003 and limited to rough diamonds used by rebels against legitimate governments — was its direct consequence.
Much time has passed since the Angolan civil war that originally triggered the transnational agreement. Is it still viable to keep the KP in its current form? The answer is no. The diamond industry has changed profoundly and is now largely centralised under national government control. Persisting along this path would amount to assuming that the only threats worth addressing are small, scattered rebel groups operating in remote territories.
International observers point instead to a far more complex reality: systemic corruption enabling the illicit enrichment of political elites, particularly in several African states; severe environmental damage caused by mining activities, including the failure to secure abandoned sites; money laundering, arms trafficking, child labour, and abuses against local communities, often subjected to forced displacement.
On the eve of the Plenary, there appeared to be a possible opening. The World Diamond Council announced an agreement among African governments to extend the definition, at least partially, to human rights violations. Yet the proposed expansion immediately proved insufficient. The core issue is no longer confined to civil wars, nor to abuses in general. The real impasse lies in the inability to address systemic violence and the responsibility of sovereign states — Zimbabwe being a paradigmatic example — within a context of escalating global geopolitical confrontation.
What makes this fracture particularly evident is the role of the third pillar of the Kimberley Process, the Civil Society Coalition (CSC), alongside governments and industry (WDC).
The NGOs that form part of the CSC, or have done so in the past, inevitably carry significant authority. Global Witness, IMPACT, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and Partnership Africa Canada have consistently insisted that discussions on human rights violations must also implicate state armed forces and private security actors serving specific power structures.
It should not be forgotten that the KP remains a voluntary law instrument: non-binding, based on national implementation and the principle of unanimity. In an increasingly polarised international environment, this architecture reveals all its weaknesses. The shortcomings — repeatedly highlighted by IGR — are further exacerbated by the lack of political convergence.
The crisis has crystallised around the Russian issue. The proposal to include in the definition violence perpetrated by state actors, militias, mercenaries, private military companies, and criminal networks was blocked by a small group of countries, with Russia at the forefront and China aligned.
What explains Russia’s refusal? Its diplomatic isolation and the international sanctions regime, which has effectively stripped Russian diamonds of any ethical legitimacy. In practical terms, US and EU sanctions, grounded in different legal frameworks, have proven more effective than the Kimberley Process itself.
The European Union’s position has been unequivocal. In an official statement, Brussels declared:
«Diamonds associated to armed conflict or systematic or widespread violence by State actors must also be labelled ‘conflict diamonds’».
It added: «The EU also regrets that the Kimberley Process was prevented from discussing how Russia’s blood diamonds, which constitute around one third of diamond production in the world, are funding Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine».
The United Kingdom has taken a similar stance, reiterating its concern over the use of revenues from Russian diamonds to finance the conflict.
Moscow’s response came through the Ministry of Finance. «We have supported, – Deputy Finance Minister Alexey Moiseev stated – the proposal by the African Diamond Producers Association (ADPA) regarding the expansion of the definition of ‘conflict diamonds’, which does not apply to sovereign states. We are convinced of its validity».
This position preserves the KP’s founding principles while explicitly excluding any accountability of sovereign states. In short, Russian diplomacy does not deny the need for greater responsibility in the trade of rough diamonds, but firmly rejects any initiative that could encroach upon national sovereignty, including measures external to the KP such as sanctions.
The outcome was paradoxical. Reform-minded countries rejected the proposed expansion precisely because it excluded references to state actors, making unanimity unattainable and effectively burying the reform.
India enters this scenario of deep paralysis. After a formal vice-chairmanship, it has agreed to assume the KP chair in 2026, for the third time since the Process was established. A decision that was difficult to avoid. Mumbai, now the world’s leading cutting hub, has a direct interest in mitigating the impact of the embargo on Russian diamonds, currently blocked and unusable for its manufacturing industry. The official statement announcing the government’s commitment remains deliberately vague and reflects, in the sphere of international rough diamond trade, the same balancing act that defines India’s broader foreign policy strategy of equidistance between blocs.
The gradual abandonment of a “sinking ship” has also involved Thailand, which from its own perspective opted to avoid a potentially costly burden. Bangkok thus relinquished the vice-chairmanship for 2026 and the chairmanship for 2027. After all, the KP does not affect the coloured gemstone sector, which remains Thailand’s core strategic interest.
The role has therefore passed to Ghana. The African perspective adopts a more cautious approach. «Conflict is no longer confined to rebel armies in the bush», explained Sammy Gyamfi, CEO of the Ghana Gold Board. «Today, diamond communities may not hear gunfire, but they feel the violence of exploitation, dispossession and exclusion».
Yet this was precisely the argument that had already emerged — and been rejected — before the Ukraine crisis. Addressing the plight of local communities inevitably entails confronting the power structures of national states. This is not a path from which an easy exit can be expected.
The clearest assessment remains that of IPIS (International Peace Information Service), an NGO participating in the KP framework. IPIS has long documented the obsolescence of the conflict diamond definition, the paralysis induced by unanimity, the narrow focus on rough diamonds alone, and the inadequacy of existing control mechanisms. Its reports convey the mounting frustration of civil society, which observes how political manoeuvring stifles demands for credible procedures, despite persistent ethical rhetoric.
The Kimberley Process has not been formally dismantled. Yet the combination of war, sanctions, and realpolitik has hollowed out its original purpose, turning it into a mechanism incapable of adapting to the contemporary dynamics of the diamond supply chain. As long as it remains anchored to an outdated definition and a unanimity rule that rewards veto power, the KP will survive only as a procedural exercise. The ethical credibility of the global diamond trade has rarely been so exposed.
Article by Paolo Minieri, published on IGR – Italian Gemological Review #22 – Spring 2026.
